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Abstract In the logic of theory change, the standard model is AGM, proposed
by Alchourrón et al. (J Symb Log 50:510–530, 1985). This paper focuses
on the extension of AGM that accounts for contractions of a theory by
a set of sentences instead of only by a single sentence. Hansson (Theoria
55:114–132, 1989), Fuhrmann and Hansson (J Logic Lang Inf 3:39–74, 1994)
generalized Partial Meet Contraction to the case of contractions by (possibly
non-singleton) sets of sentences. In this paper we present the possible worlds
semantics for partial meet multiple contractions.
Keywords Belief change · Theory contraction · Multiple contraction ·
Possible worlds semantics
1 Introduction
One of the main concerns of the logic of theory change consists in modeling
how information is removed from the set of beliefs of an agent; in other words,
one of its fundamental purposes is to find appropriate ways of defining con-
traction operations. Roughly speaking, given a set of beliefs, such a function
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receives a sentence or a set of sentences that is intended to be removed from it
and returns a new set of beliefs that no longer contains the given sentence(s).
All earlier investigations of this processes [1, 9–12] dealt essentially with the
removal of a specific sentence from a belief set — a set of sentences closed
under logical consequence. The first and most widely known constructive
model of such an operation is the partial meet contraction [1]. The possible
worlds semantics for this operation was introduced in [12].
However, in a subsequent stage of the development of the theory of belief
contraction, several researchers (e.g. [6–8, 13, 16]) pointed out the need for
defining operations that could account for changes consisting of the removal
of sets with more than one element. In this respect, Fuhrmann and Hansson
[8] remarked that contracting a belief set K by a set of sentences B can mean
either to remove all elements of B from K (package contractions), or to remove
at least one of the elements of B from K (choice contractions). In the present
paper we will only consider the first of those two kinds of operations and
we will use the expression multiple contraction to refer to such functions.
Furthermore, we will restrict our attention to the case when the sets to be
contracted from K are finite. Hence, throughout this paper whenever we refer
to the multiple contraction of a belief set K by a set of sentences B, such set
B is assumed to be finite. We will use the expression singleton contraction to
designate contractions by a single sentence.
The first constructive model of multiple contractions to be presented was
the partial meet multiple contraction in [13, 14]. The operations of multiple
contraction defined within such model are essentially the generalization to the
case of contraction by sets of sentences (rather than by a single sentence) of the
partial meet (singleton) contraction functions. Nevertheless, a possible worlds
semantics has not yet been provided for such generalization.
In this work we aim to provide such possible worlds semantics for the partial
meet multiple contractions, inspired in the analogous model for the singleton
case proposed by Grove [12] and generalized by Hansson [15].
The paper is organized in the following way: In Section 2 we provide
the notation and background needed for the rest of the paper. In Section 3
we provide the possible worlds semantics for the partial meet multiple con-
tractions. The Appendix contains the proofs of all the original results.
2 Background
2.1 Formal Preliminaries
We will assume a language L that is closed under truth-functional operations.
We shall make use of a consequence operation Cn that takes sets of sentences
to sets of sentences and which satisfies the following properties:
– inclusion: A ⊆ Cn(A),
– monotony: if A ⊆ B, then Cn(A) ⊆ Cn(B),
Possible Worlds Semantics for Partial Meet Multiple Contraction 9
– idempotence: Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A)),
– supraclassicality: if α can be derived from A by classical truth-functional
logic, then α ∈ Cn(A),
– deduction: if β ∈ Cn(A ∪ {α}), then (α → β) ∈ Cn(A),
– compactness: if α ∈ Cn(A), then α ∈ Cn(A′) for some finite subset A′
of A.
We will sometimes use Cn(α) for Cn({α}), A  α for α ∈ Cn(A),  α for α ∈
Cn(∅), A 	 α for α 	∈ Cn(A), 	 α for α 	∈ Cn(∅). The letters α, αi, β, . . . (except
for γ ) will be used to denote sentences. 
 stands for an arbitrary tautology and
⊥ for an arbitrary contradiction. A, Ai, B, . . . shall denote subsets of sentences
of L. K is reserved to represent a set of sentences that is closed under logical
consequence (i.e. K = Cn(K)) — such a set is called a belief set or theory. The
conjunction of all elements of a finite and non-empty set A shall be denoted by
&A. We shall denote the set of all maximal consistent subsets of L by ML. We
will use the expression possible world (or just world) to designate an element
of ML. M,Ni,W, . . ., (except for L and P), shall be used to denote subsets
of ML. Such sets are called propositions. Given a set of sentences R, the set
consisting of all the possible worlds that contain R is denoted by ‖R‖. The
elements of ‖R‖ are the R-worlds. ‖ϕ‖ is an abbreviation of ‖{ϕ}‖ and the
elements of ‖ϕ‖ are the ϕ-worlds. To any set of possible worlds V we associate a
belief set Th(V) given by Th(V) = ⋂V — under the assumption that ⋂ ∅ = L.
M, Ni, W, . . . shall be used to denote subsets of P(ML).
2.2 Partial Meet Contractions
A Partial Meet Contraction function [1, 3] is built upon a selection from the
maximal subsets of K that do not imply the sentence to be contracted. In what
follows we present the formal definition of such functions.
Given a belief set K and a set of sentences B, the remainder set of K by
B is the set of maximal subsets of K that do not imply any element of B
and is denoted by K⊥B. Its elements are the remainders (of K, by B). K⊥α
is an abbreviation of K⊥{α} and is called the remainder set of K by α. It is
also convenient to notice here that, according to [2, Observation 2.2], since
we are assuming that the consequence operation Cn is compact, it holds that
K⊥B 	= ∅ if and only if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
Definition 2.1 Let K be a belief set. A selection function for K is a function γ
such that for all sentences α: ∅ 	= γ (K⊥α) ⊆ K⊥α, if K⊥α 	= ∅, and γ (K⊥α) =
{K}, otherwise.
An operation−is a partial meet contraction on K if and only if there is a
selection function γ for K such that for all sentences α: K − α = ⋂ γ (K⊥α).
Next we present the possible worlds semantics for partial meet contractions.
To do that we first notice that propositions (sets of possible worlds) can be
used to represent belief sets and sentences. More precisely, a belief set K can
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be represented by the set ‖K‖ and a sentence α can be identified with the
set ‖α‖.
The following result clarifies more formally the above mentioned interrela-
tion between belief sets and sets of possible worlds:
Proposition 2.2 ([4]) Let H, K be belief sets and U,V be sets of possible worlds.
Then:
(i) Th(‖K‖) = K.
(ii) If U ⊆ V , then Th(V) ⊆ Th(U).
(iii) If H ⊆ K, then ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖H‖.
When considering a propositional approach to represent sentences and
belief sets, the contraction of K by α takes the form of the addition of some ¬α-
worlds to the set ‖K‖. In order to clarify this statement we start by exposing,
in the following observation, the very tight interconnection between the sets
K⊥ϕ and ‖¬ϕ‖, for some belief set K and some sentence ϕ ∈ K:
Observation 2.3 (Grove’s bijection [12, Section 4]) Let K be a belief set and ϕ
be a sentence such that ϕ ∈ K. Then the function g from ‖¬ϕ‖ to K⊥ϕ def ined by
g(W) = Th(‖K‖ ∪ {W}), for all W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖, is a bijection. Moreover ‖g(W)‖ =
‖K‖ ∪ {W}, for all W ∈ ‖¬ϕ‖.
Now we introduce the concept of propositional selection function, which we
will use afterwords to present the possible worlds semantics for the partial meet
contractions.
Definition 2.4 ([15, Definition 3.65]) Let M be a proposition. A propositional
selection function for M is a function f such that for all sentences α: (1)
f (‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖, (2) If ‖α‖ 	= ∅ then f (‖α‖) 	= ∅ and (3) If M ∩ ‖α‖ 	= ∅, then
f (‖α‖) = M ∩ ‖α‖.
We are now in position to present the following observation, which illus-
trates how the partial meet contractions can be described in terms of possible
worlds.
Observation 2.5 ([12], [15, Observation 2.69]) Let K be a belief set. An
operation−on K is a partial meet contraction if and only if there is a propo-
sitional selection function f for ‖K‖ such that for all sentences α: K − α =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ f (‖¬α‖)).
2.3 Partial Meet Multiple Contractions
Now we recall the definition of the partial meet multiple contractions, which
are the generalization of the partial meet contraction functions to the case of
contractions by (possibly non-singleton) sets.
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Definition 2.6 (Partial meet multiple contraction [8, 13]) Let K be a belief
set. A package selection function for K is a function γ such that for all
sets of sentences B: ∅ 	= γ (K⊥B) ⊆ K⊥B, if K⊥B 	= ∅, and γ (K⊥B) = {K},
otherwise.
An operation ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K if and only if there
is some package selection function γ for K, such that for all sets of sentences
B: K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B).
An operation ÷ on K is a maxichoice multiple contraction if and only if it is
a partial meet multiple contraction generated by a package selection function
γ such that for all sets B, the set γ (K⊥B) has exactly one element. The full
meet multiple contraction on K is the partial meet multiple contraction ·∼· that
is generated by the package selection function γ such that for all sets B, if
K⊥B 	= ∅, then γ (K⊥B) = K⊥B, i.e., K ·∼· B =
⋂
K⊥B, if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, and
K ·∼· B = K, otherwise.
3 Possible Worlds Semantics for Partial Meet Multiple Contractions
In this section our main goal is to obtain the possible worlds semantics for
the partial meet multiple contractions. In the case of singleton contraction
the possible worlds semantics proposed by Grove [12] and generalized by
Hansson [15] is essentially based on the relation between remainder sets (by
a single sentence) and sets of possible worlds which is expressed by Grove’s
bijection (Observation 2.3). Having this in mind, to achieve our goal, we will
start by finding out the relation between remainder sets by sets of sentences
and sets of possible worlds, which is the generalization of Grove’s bijection to
the multiple case. Afterwards, by making use of such relation we present the
characterization of the partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible
worlds.
3.1 Possible Worlds Semantics for Remainders
A partial meet contraction K − α is defined as the intersection of some of the
elements of the remainder set K⊥α, where each element of the remainder set is
a maximal subset of K that does not entail α. In the possible worlds model this
corresponds to adding to ‖K‖ the minimal number of worlds such that ‖K −
α‖ 	⊆ ‖α‖. According Grove’s bijection this corresponds simply to adding one
and only one ¬α-world to ‖K‖. By this simple relation, partial meet singleton
contraction in terms of possible worlds is defined as ‖K‖ plus some (selected)
¬α-worlds.
The definition of remainder in multiple contraction is similar to the single-
ton case, i.e., maximal subsets of K that do not entail any element of B. This
corresponds in terms of possible worlds to adding to ‖K‖ the minimal number
of worlds such that they guarantee that no element of B can be inferred from
the remainder set, i.e., ‖K÷B‖ 	⊆ ‖αi‖ for all αi ∈ B. More precisely, in what
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follows we will show that if X ∈ K⊥B, then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W), for some
W ⊆ ML such that, on the one hand W contains at least one ¬αi-world for
all αi ∈ B ∩ K and, on the other hand, if W ∈ W then W is the only ¬α j-world
included in W , for some α j ∈ B ∩ K.
To see that this indeed holds, we start by formally introducing, in the
following definition, the set WK⊥B, composed by all the sets of possible worlds
that satisfy the above mentioned conditions.
Definition 3.1 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. We denote
by WK⊥B the subset of P
(⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}
)
such that W ∈ WK⊥B if and
only if:
1. W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K.
2. If M ∈ W then there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = {M}.
Although this definition is clear, it is not easy to understand how a remain-
der set can be “constructed” in terms of possible worlds. The most intuitive
approach is to assume that each remainder set corresponds to ‖K‖ plus one
and only one ¬αi-world for each αi ∈ B, which basically correspond to take
individual remainders from each member of B. However, this is not the case.
On Fig. 1 we can see a remainder set which includes more than one ¬α1-world.
On the other hand, Figs. 2 and 3 show that we cannot define a remainder
Fig. 1 Example of
a remainder set for
B = {α1, α2, α3} that
includes more than
one ¬α1 − world
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Fig. 2 Example of
a remainder set
for B = {α1, α2}
by taking the αi ∈ B one by one, instead a global strategy is needed. Note
that in Fig. 3, if we drop the world in ‖¬α2‖ \ ‖¬α1‖ no element of B is
recovered.
Fig. 3 Example of
a non remainder set
for B = {α1, α2}
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Now we investigate the composition of the set WK⊥B:
Observation 3.2 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. Then the
following statements hold:
1. B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = ∅.
2. B ∩ K = ∅ if and only if WK⊥B = {∅}.
3. B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅ if and only if WK⊥B 	= ∅ and ∅ 	∈ WK⊥B.
Notice that according to the above observation (and excluding the limiting
cases 1 and 2) the set WK⊥B contains at least one non-empty set of worlds,
from which it follows that we can use WK⊥B in the construction of partial meet
multiple contraction by means of a propositional package selection function
(as in the singleton case):
Definition 3.3 Let K be a belief set. A propositional package selection function
for ‖K‖ is a function f such that for all sets of sentences B: (1) f (WK⊥B) ⊆
WK⊥B, and (2) if WK⊥B 	= ∅ then f (WK⊥B) 	= ∅.
In what follows we present the relation between WK⊥B and K⊥B. Such
relationship will play an analogous role to the one played by Grove’s bijection
in the singleton case.
Theorem 3.4 Let K be a belief set and B be a f inite set of sentences. Then:
1. If W ∈ WK⊥B then X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) ∈ K⊥B.
2. If X ∈ K⊥B then there is some W ∈ WK⊥B such that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W).
The first statement of the theorem means that the sets in WK⊥B are minimal
sets of worlds in the sense that the addition of each of those sets to ‖K‖
corresponds to a maximal subset of K that does not imply any element of B.
The second statement yields that each of the remainders can be constructed by
means of a set of WK⊥B.
As an immediate consequence of the above observation we can define K⊥B
in terms of possible worlds:
Corollary 3.5 Let K be a belief set and B be a f inite set of sentences. Then
K⊥B = {Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ WK⊥B}.
3.2 Possible Worlds Semantics for Partial Meet Multiple Contraction
Having characterized the remainders in terms of possible worlds, our next
goal is to obtain the possible worlds semantics for partial meet multiple
contractions. As in the singleton case, the lower bound of partial meet multiple
contraction would be full meet multiple contraction, hence we will start by
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obtaining the possible worlds semantics for that limiting case of partial meet
contractions. Since full meet multiple contraction is given by the intersection
of all the element of the remainder set, the corresponding construction in the
semantic level is by adding to ‖K‖ all the elements of ⋃ WK⊥B as it is stated in
the following observation:
Observation 3.6 Let K be a belief set, B a set of sentences and ·∼· be the full meet
multiple contraction on K. Then















Observation 3.7 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. Then:
1.
⋃
WK⊥B ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}.
2. If B ∩ K 	= ∅ then it may not hold that ⋃ WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}.
(Provided that K 	= Cn(∅))
3. If M is a world such that (i) M ∈ ‖¬α j‖ for some α j ∈ B ∩ K, (ii) M 	∈ ‖¬αl‖
for every αl ∈ B \ {α j}, and (iii) there is some αr ∈ B ∩ K such that ‖¬αr‖ ⊂
‖¬α j‖, then M 	∈ ⋃ WK⊥B.
The above observation reveals a big difference between the singleton and
the multiple case: In singleton contraction, the full meet contraction K ∼ α
corresponds to the addition of the whole set ‖¬α‖ to ‖K‖. However Point 3 of
the previous observation clarifies that the full meet multiple contraction does
not correspond, in general, to the addition of all the ¬αi-worlds to ‖K‖.
In order to find out which worlds of the set
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} are
indeed included in
⋃
WK⊥B, we shall start by finding a way of defining a
subset of
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} that does not contain any world M satisfying
(simultaneously) conditions (i)−(iii) mentioned in Point 3 of the previous
observation.
Having this in mind, we now notice that, if we consider a subset B′ of B
consisting of those and only those sentences αi in B such that for any sentence
α j ∈ B, it holds that ‖¬α j‖ 	⊂ ‖¬αi‖, then the elements of the set ⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ B′ ∩ K} do not simultaneously satisfy the conditions (i)−(iii) mentioned
above.
Definition 3.8 (Normalization of a set of sentences) Let B be a set of sen-
tences. The normalization of B is the subset BN ⊆ B, defined in the following
way:
BN = {αi ∈ B : For all α j ∈ B it holds that ‖¬α j‖ 	⊂ ‖¬αi‖}.
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We are now in a position to explicitly indicate which worlds compose the set⋃
WK⊥B:




{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}.
Combining the identity just presented in the above observation with the
result of Observation 3.6 we can obtain a characterization of the full meet
multiple contraction:1
Observation 3.10 Let K be a belief set, B be a set of sentences and ·∼· be the
operator of full meet multiple contraction on K. Then, under the assumption
that
⋂ ∅ = L, it holds that








{Cn(¬αi) : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
.
Next we introduce one last observation concerning the full meet multiple
contraction, that explicitly indicates which worlds compose the set ‖K ·∼· B‖:
Observation 3.11 Let K be a belief set, B be a set of sentences and ·∼· be the
operator of full meet multiple contraction on K. Then






{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
.
Now that we have thoroughly exposed the characterization in terms of
possible worlds of the full meet multiple contraction, we turn our attention to
obtain the possible worlds semantics of the partial meet multiple contractions
in general. We start by using Observation 3.11 to obtain a superset of the set
‖K÷B‖, where ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K:
Observation 3.12 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences. If an
operation ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K then
‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪
(⋃
{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
.
1Such characterization generalizes the result of [3, Observation 2.1] which states that if ∼ is the
operator of full meet contraction on a belief set K then K ∼ ϕ = K ∩ Cn(¬ϕ) if ϕ ∈ K, and K ∼
ϕ = K if ϕ 	∈ K.
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Our next goal is to obtain the possible worlds semantics for the partial meet
multiple contractions. In order to do that we will present first the following
observation:
Observation 3.13 Let K be a belief set and B and C be sets of sentences. Then
1. WK⊥B = WK⊥(BN∩K).
2. K⊥B = K⊥C iff WK⊥B = WK⊥C.
The above observation essentially states (through the representation of
remainders in terms of possible worlds) that the remainder set of K by B
coincides with the remainder set of K by BN ∩ K. Therefore K÷B is identical
to K÷(BN ∩ K) whenever ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction. We can
now present the main result of the paper, which provides the characterization
of partial meet multiple contractions in terms of possible worlds.
Theorem 3.14 Let K be a belief set. An operation ÷ is a partial meet multiple
contraction on K if and only if there exists a propositional package selection








Using the above theorem and Theorem 3.4 it can be easily shown that if f is
such that, for any set of sentences B, f (WK⊥B) contains at most one element,
then the operation ÷ defined by K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
is a maxi-
choice multiple contraction on K. On the other hand, it is also worth noticing
that it follows immediately from Observation 3.6 that the operation ·∼· of full
meet multiple contraction on K is such that K ·∼· B = Th
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
,
where f (WK⊥B) = WK⊥B.
4 Conclusions
We have presented the possible worlds semantics for the partial meet multiple
contraction which generalizes the possible worlds semantics for partial meet
(singleton) contraction presented in [12, 15].
To be more precise we have shown that every remainder X ∈ K⊥B is such
that X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) for some set of possible worlds W such that (i) W
contains at least one ¬αi-world for every αi ∈ B ∩ K and (ii) for every world
in W there is a sentence α ∈ B ∩ K for which that one is the only ¬α-world
in W . Subsequently we have proven that partial meet multiple contractions
can be defined by means of intersections of sets of the form ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ M),
where M consists of a selection of sets of possible worlds that satisfy the above
conditions (i) and (ii).
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In particular, we have also characterized in terms of possible worlds the
upper and lower bounds of that class of functions, i.e., full meet and maxichoice
multiple contractions.
Based on these results, in [5] we introduced a new class of multiple contrac-
tion functions — the system of spheres-based multiple contractions — which are
a generalization to the case of contraction by (possibly non-singleton) sets of
sentences of Grove’s system of spheres-based contraction functions.
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Lemma 4.1 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences such that B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅. If X ∈ K⊥B then ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N , where N ⊆ ML is such that:
1. N ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}.
2. N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K.
Proof If B ∩ K = ∅ then K⊥B = {K} and the rest of the proof follows trivially.
Now assume B ∩ K 	= ∅ and let X ∈ K⊥B.
1. Since X ⊆ K, it follows from Proposition 2.2-(iii) that ‖K‖ ⊆ ‖X‖. Now
we prove that ‖X‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}
)
. Let M be an arbitrary el-
ement of ‖X‖. Assume by redutio that M 	∈ (‖K‖∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}
))
,
then there is some δ ∈ K such that ¬δ ∧ &B ∈ M. Therefore, because M is
consistent, it follows that δ ∨ ¬&B 	∈ M. Then, on the one hand, from M ∈
‖X‖ it follows that δ ∨ ¬&B 	∈ X and, on the other hand, since δ ∈ K, then
δ ∨ ¬&B ∈ K. So it holds that δ ∨ ¬&B ∈ K \ X. Now, since X ∈ K⊥B, it
follows that there is some α j ∈ B such that α j ∈ Cn(X ∪ {δ ∨ ¬&B}). Then,
by deduction it follows that (¬δ ∧ &B) ∨ α j ∈ Cn(X). But, from α j ∈ B it
follows that (¬δ ∧ &B) ∨ α j ↔ α j. Therefore we obtain that α j ∈ Cn(X),
which contradicts the fact that X ∈ K⊥B. Hence we can conclude that
‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N , where N ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B}.
2. Let αi ∈ B and assume by redutio that ‖X‖ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ = ∅. Then it follows
that αi ∈ Cn(X) which contradicts the fact that X ∈ K⊥B. Therefore we
have that ‖X‖ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B, hence ‖N‖ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all
αi ∈ B ∩ K. 
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Lemma 4.2 Let K be a belief set, B be a f inite set of sentences and N be a subset
of ML. If N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K, then there is some set N ′ such that
N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈ WK⊥B.2
Proof If B ∩ K = ∅ then it is enough to define N ′ = ∅ and the required condi-
tions are trivially satisfied. So, we assume B ∩ K 	= ∅. For each αi ∈ B ∩ K let
Mαi be one (arbitrarily chosen) world in N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ (recall that N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅,
for all αi ∈ B ∩ K) and consider the set N0 = {Mαi : αi ∈ B ∩ K}.
Notice that, since B is finite, B ∩ K also is and, therefore, we may assume
without loss of generality that N0 = {M1, . . . , Mn}, with n ≥ 1. Next, for each
m ∈ {1, . . . n}, let Nm be the set defined in the following way:
Nm =
{
Nm−1 \ {Mm} , if Nm−1 ∩ ‖¬αp‖ 	= {Mm} for all αp ∈ B ∩ K
Nm−1 , if Nm−1 ∩ ‖¬αq‖ = {Mm} for some αq ∈ B ∩ K
It follows immediately from the above construction that: (1) Nn ⊆ N ⊆⋃
αi∈(B∩K) ‖¬αi‖, (2) Nn ∩ ‖¬αk‖ 	= ∅, for all αk ∈ B ∩ K and (3) If Mi ∈ Nn
then there is some αq ∈ B ∩ K such that Nn ∩ ‖¬αq‖ = {Mi}. So accord-
ing to Definition 3.1, Nn ∈ WK⊥B. So, we put N ′ = Nn and this finishes
the proof. 
Lemma 4.3 Let B be a set of sentences. If αl ∈ B and αl 	∈ BN then there is some
αk ∈ BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖.
Proof Let αl ∈ B \ BN . It follows from the definition of BN that there is some
αs ∈ B such that ‖¬αs‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. If αs ∈ BN this ends the proof. Assume αs 	∈
BN , then using the same arguments, there is some αs1 ∈ B such that ‖¬αs1‖ ⊂
‖¬αs‖. Now, on the one hand, if αs1 ∈ BN this ends the proof because under
this conditions we have that ‖¬αs1‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. On the other hand, if αs1 	∈ BN ,
reasoning in an analogous way we can find a αs2 ∈ B which is related to αs1 in
precisely in the same way that αs1 was related to αs and so on.
Now consider the sequence of sentences (δn) defined in the following way
δ1 = αs, δ2 = αs1 , δ3 = αs2 , . . ., where the next terms of this sequence are the
consecutive elements of B obtained using the process just described.
Note that ‖¬δ j‖ 	⊆ ‖¬δi‖ whenever j < i.
Since B is finite there must be some δm ∈ B such that for all α j ∈ B, if
‖¬α j‖ ⊆ ‖¬δm‖, then ‖¬δm‖ ⊆ ‖¬α j‖, which means that δm ∈ BN .
And it follows from the construction of the sequence (δn) that ‖¬δm‖ ⊂
‖¬αl‖, and this ends the proof. 
2Notice that from N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K, it follows that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅.
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Lemma 4.4 Let K be a belief set, B be a set of sentences such that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
and f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 	 ¬α} → P(ML) be a function such that if α ∈ L and
	 ¬α then ∅ 	= f (‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖. If B f ⊆ B is such that:
(i) If α j ∈ B f then f (‖¬αk‖) = f (‖¬α j‖) or f (‖¬αk‖) 	⊂ ‖¬α j‖, for all αk ∈
B f ,
(ii) For all αl ∈ B ∩ K there is some αm ∈ B f ∩ K such that f (‖¬αm‖) ⊆
‖¬αl‖,
then
1. For every world M ∈ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K} there is some subset
WM ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}, such that M ∈ WM and WM ∈ WK⊥B.
2. {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}} 	= ∅ and ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}} = ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}.
Proof Let B f ⊆ B be such that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
1. If B ∩ K = ∅ then B f ∩ K = ∅ and 1. is vacuously true. Let B ∩ K 	= ∅. Let
α j be an arbitrary element of B f ∩ K and M be an arbitrary element of
f (‖¬α j‖). First we prove that if αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩ M then ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈
B f ∩ K} ∩ ‖α j‖ ∩ ‖¬αl‖ 	= ∅. Let αl be an arbitrary element of B ∩ K ∩
M. Then from (ii), it follows that there is some αm ∈ B f ∩ K such that
f (‖¬αm‖) ⊆ ‖¬αl‖.
Furthermore, in these conditions, it holds that f (‖¬αm‖) 	⊆ ‖¬α j‖. To
prove this we will show that (a) f (‖¬αm‖) 	= ‖¬α j‖ and (b) f (‖¬αm‖) 	⊂
‖¬α j‖.
(a) Since αl ∈ M it follows that M 	∈ ‖¬αl‖ and because f (‖¬αm‖) ⊆
‖¬αl‖, we obtain that M 	∈ f (‖¬αm‖). On the other hand, from M ∈
f (‖¬α j‖) and f (‖¬α j‖) ⊆ ‖¬α j‖ it follows that M ∈ ‖¬α j‖ and we
are done.
(b) Due to αm ∈ B f , according to (i), it holds that f (‖¬αm‖) = f (‖¬α j‖)
or f (‖¬αm‖) 	⊂ ‖¬α j‖. On the other hand, since M ∈ f (‖¬α j‖), from
M 	∈ f (‖¬αm‖) (already proven above) it follows that f (‖¬αm‖) 	=
f (‖¬α j‖). Therefore f (‖¬αm‖) 	⊂ ‖¬α j‖.
Hence, if αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩ M it holds that ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K} ∩ ‖α j‖ ∩
‖¬αl‖ 	= ∅.
Let W be the set defined by W = {M} ∪ {Mαl : αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩ M}, where
for each αl ∈ B ∩ K ∩ M, Mαl is an arbitrary element of
⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈
B f ∩ K} ∩ ‖α j‖ ∩ ‖¬αl‖. Since W ⊆ ML is such that W ∩ ‖¬αk‖ 	= ∅ for
all αk ∈ B ∩ K, it follows immediately from Lemma 4.2 that there is some
set W ′ such that W ′ ⊆ W and W ′ ∈ WK⊥B.
Furthermore, W ′ ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K} and, due to W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ =
{M}, recalling that W ′ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K (according to
Definition 3.1), from W ′ ⊆ W we can conclude that M ∈ W ′.
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Hence, if we define WM = W ′ then WM ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K},
M ∈ WM and WM ∈ WK⊥B, as required.
2. Case 1, B ∩ K = ∅. Then, according to Observation 3.2-2., WK⊥B = {∅}.
Hence, {W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}} = {∅} 	= ∅.
On the other hand, since B f ⊆ B, it holds that B f ∩ K = ∅ and, conse-
quently,
⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K} = ⋃∅ = ∅ and the rest is trivial.
Case 2, B ∩ K 	= ∅. Then, from (ii) we can conclude that B f ∩ K 	= ∅ and
it follows immediately from 1 (already proven above) that {W ∈ WK⊥B :
W ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}} 	= ∅. Finally it follows immediately from
1. that
⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) : αi ∈ B f ∩ K}} = ⋃{ f (‖¬αi‖) :
αi ∈ B f ∩ K}. 
Lemma 4.5 Let K be a belief set and B be a set of sentences such that B ∩
Cn(∅) = ∅. Then ⋃{W ∈ WK⊥B : W ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}} = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ BN ∩ K}.
Proof We will prove this lemma using Lemma 4.4-2. Considering the function
f : {‖α‖ : α ∈ L and 	 ¬α} → P(ML) defined by f (‖α‖) = ‖α‖ and B f =
BN where BN is the normalization of B. Then it obviously holds that if α ∈ L
and 	 ¬α then ∅ 	= f (‖α‖) ⊆ ‖α‖. In order to finish the proof we prove that
both conditions (i) and (ii) of Lemma 4.4 are satisfied. Condition (i) follows
immediately from Definition 3.8. For (ii) let αl be an arbitrary element of
B ∩ K, we must show that there is some αm ∈ BN ∩ K such that ‖¬αm‖ ⊆
‖¬αl‖ (since f (‖¬αm‖) = ‖¬αm‖). To prove this we consider two cases:
Case 1 αl ∈ BN . Then αl ∈ BN ∩ K and ‖¬αl‖ ⊆ ‖¬αl‖, and we are done.
Case 2 αl 	∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that there is some αm ∈
BN such that ‖¬αm‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖. On the other hand, from αl ∈ K and
‖¬αm‖ ⊂ ‖¬αl‖ we can conclude that αm ∈ K. Hence, we have that
αm ∈ BN ∩ K and ‖¬αm‖ ⊆ ‖¬αl‖, as required and this finishes the
proof. 
Lemma 4.6 Let K be a belief set and G and H be sets of sentences. If every
subset X of K implies some element of G if and only if X implies some element
of H, then for all βi ∈ GN ∩ K there is some ςi ∈ HN ∩ K such that ‖βi‖ = ‖ςi‖.
Proof Assume that every subset X of K implies some element of G if and
only if X implies some element of H and let βi ∈ GN ∩ K. We will start by
showing that there is an element of HN ∩ K which is logically equivalent to
βi. Since {βi} ⊆ K and {βi}  βi ∈ G, it follows from the hypothesis that there
is some ςi ∈ H such that {βi}  ςi. Then, by deduction we have that  βi → ςi
which is equivalent to ‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖. Since K is a belief set, we can conclude
that ςi ∈ K, hence, proceeding analogously, we can conclude that there is some
β j ∈ G such that ‖¬β j‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖. Then we have that ‖¬β j‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖, and from
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the fact that βi ∈ GN we can conclude that ‖¬β j‖ = ‖¬βi‖. So, it holds that
‖¬βi‖ = ‖¬ςi‖.
It remains to prove that ςi ∈ HN ∩ K. We already have that ςi ∈ H ∩ K.
To show that ςi ∈ HN we must prove that for all ς j ∈ H it holds that if
‖¬ς j‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖ then ‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬ς j‖. So, let ς j ∈ H be such that ‖¬ς j‖ ⊆ ‖¬ςi‖.
Since ‖¬βi‖ = ‖¬ςi‖, it follows that ‖¬ς j‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖. Reasoning as above we
can conclude that there is some βl ∈ G such that ‖¬βl‖ ⊆ ‖¬ς j‖. Then we
have that ‖¬βl‖ ⊆ ‖¬βi‖, and again from the fact that βi ∈ GN we obtain that
‖¬βl‖ = ‖¬βi‖, which allows us to conclude that ‖¬ςi‖ ⊆ ‖¬ς j‖ as required.

Proofs
Proof of Observation 3.2 In order to prove that the statements 1.-3. are sat-
isfied it is enough to show that (i) if B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅ then WK⊥B = ∅, (ii) if
B ∩ K = ∅ then WK⊥B = {∅}, and (iii) if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅ then
WK⊥B 	= ∅ and ∅ 	∈ WK⊥B.
(i) Let B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. We will prove that WK⊥B = ∅. Let α j ∈ B ∩ Cn(∅).
Then α j ∈ B ∩ K and ‖¬α j‖ = ∅. Therefore, there is no W such that W ∩
‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K. Hence WK⊥B = ∅.
(ii) Let B ∩ K = ∅. Then it follows that {‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} = ∅ and then,
by Definition 3.1, the set WK⊥B is such that WK⊥B ⊆ P(∅) = {∅}. There-
fore either WK⊥B = ∅ or WK⊥B = {∅}. Given that B ∩ K = ∅, we have
trivially that 1. ∅ ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K; and 2. If M ∈ ∅ then
there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K such that ∅ ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = M. Hence, according to
Definition 3.1, ∅ ∈ WK⊥B.
(iii) Let B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅. Then for every αi ∈ B ∩ K we have
that ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅. Let Mαi be one (arbitrarily chosen) ¬αi-world and
consider the set N = {Mαi : αi ∈ B ∩ K}. It follows immediately from
Lemma 4.2 that there is some set N ′ such that N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈ WK⊥B.
Hence WK⊥B 	= ∅. Let α j be an arbitrary sentence of B ∩ K. Then, since
∅ ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = ∅, it follows from Definition 3.1 that ∅ 	∈ WK⊥B. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4
1. We will consider three cases separately:
Case a B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. Then, according to Observation 3.2-1., it holds
that WK⊥B = ∅ and we are done.
Case b B ∩ K = ∅. Then, by Observation 3.2-2., we have that WK⊥B =
{∅}. On the other hand K⊥B = {K}. Hence, it follows immediately
from the fact that Th(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) = Th(‖K‖) = K (by Proposition
2.2-(i)) that if W ∈ WK⊥B then Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) ∈ K⊥B.
Case c B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅. Then, by Observation 3.2-3.,
WK⊥B 	= ∅ and ∅ 	∈ WK⊥B. Let W ∈ WK⊥B. Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) =⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ W) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩ (⋂W) = K ∩ (⋂W). Hence, we have
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to prove that (i) K ∩ (⋂W) ⊆ K; (ii) Cn (K ∩ (⋂W)) ∩ B = ∅
and (iii) if β ∈ K \ (K ∩ (⋂W)) then Cn ((K ∩ (⋂W)) ∪ {β}) ∩
B 	= ∅.
Condition (i) is trivially satisfied. Regarding (ii), let αi be an arbitrary
element of B, we will show that αi 	∈ Cn
(
K ∩ (⋂W)). If αi ∈ B \ K, it
is obvious that αi 	∈ Cn
(
K ∩ (⋂W)). If αi ∈ B ∩ K, then, according to
Definition 3.1, there is some world M ∈ W such that M ∈ ‖¬αi‖. Therefore
αi 	∈ M. Hence, since K ∩
(⋂
W
) ⊆ M, αi 	∈ Cn
(
K ∩ (⋂W)). Finally, in
order to prove (iii), let β ∈ K \ (K ∩ (⋂W)). Hence there is some M ∈
W such that β 	∈ M. Therefore, because M ∈ ML, it holds that ¬β ∈
M. Since M ∈ W , according to Definition 3.1, there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K
such that W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = {M}. Now, from ¬β ∈ M, α j ∈ K and α j ∈ Wi,
for every Wi ∈ W \ M, it follows that ¬β ∨ α j ∈
(
K ∩ (⋂W)). Therefore
α j ∈ Cn
((
K ∩ (⋂W)) ∪ {β}), and then Cn ((K ∩ (⋂W)) ∪ {β}) ∩ B 	= ∅
as required.
2. We will divide the proof in cases:
Case a B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. Then K⊥B = ∅ and we are done.
Case b B ∩ K = ∅. Let X ∈ K⊥B. Then X = K (because K⊥B = {K}).
According to Observation 3.2-2. it holds that WK⊥B = {∅}. Ob-
serving that Th(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) = Th(‖K‖) = K (by Proposition 2.2-
(i)), we can conclude that W = ∅ is such that W ∈ WK⊥B and
X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ W), as required.
Case c B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅. Let X ∈ K⊥B. It follows from
Lemma 4.1 that ‖X‖ = ‖K‖ ∪ N , where N ⊆ ML is such that
N ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K. Then, since it follows from
Proposition 2.2-(i) that X = Th(‖X‖), we can conclude that X =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ).
On the other hand, in the above conditions, according to Lemma 4.2, there
is some set N ′ such that N ′ ⊆ N and N ′ ∈ WK⊥B.
Let X ′ = Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ′). To finish the proof it is enough to show that X =
X ′. Now, to see that this is indeed the case, we start by observing that,
since ‖K‖ ∪ N ′ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ N , it follows from Proposition 2.2-(ii) that X =
Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ) ⊆ Th(‖K‖ ∪ N ′) = X ′. Furthermore, according to point 1.
proven above, because N ′ ∈ WK⊥B, we also have that X ′ ∈ K⊥B. Hence,
in particular it holds that X ′ ⊆ K and Cn(X ′) ∩ B = ∅. From this and the
fact that X ∈ K⊥B it follows that X 	⊂ X ′. Therefore, since X ⊆ X ′, we
can conclude that X = X ′, and this finishes the proof. 
Proof of Observation 3.6 If B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅, according to Corollary 3.5 it
follows that K ·∼· B =
⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ WK⊥B} = ⋂{⋂(‖K‖ ∪ W) :
W ∈ WK⊥B} = ⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ WK⊥B
)) = (⋂ ‖K‖) ∩ (⋂ (⋃ WK⊥B
)) =
K ∩ (⋂ (⋃ WK⊥B
))
.
Let B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. Then, on the one hand, K ·∼· B = K and, on the
other hand, WK⊥B = ∅ (according to Observation 3.2-1.) and, consequently,
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⋃
WK⊥B = ∅. Hence we only need to show that K = ⋂(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) and K =
K ∩ (⋂∅). But, the former identity follows immediately from Proposition 2.2-
(i), and the latter equality is an obvious consequence of our assumption that
Th(∅) = ⋂ ∅ = L. 
Proof of Observation 3.7
1. According to Definition 3.1, we have that WK⊥B ⊆ P
(⋃ {‖¬αi‖ :
αi ∈ B ∩ K}), which implies immediately that ⋃ WK⊥B ⊆ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈
B ∩ K}.
2. We will show a counterexample: Let α1, α2, α3 be three sentences such
that α1, α2, α3 ∈ K \ Cn(∅). Furthermore, assume that ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖,
‖¬α2‖ 	⊂ ‖¬α3‖, ‖¬α3‖ 	⊂ ‖¬α2‖ and ‖¬α1‖ \ (‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖) 	= ∅ and let
M be an arbitrary element of ‖¬α1‖ \ (‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖). Now consider
the set B = {α1, α2, α3}. It is obvious that M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K}.
However, on the other hand, M 	∈ ⋃ WK⊥B. Indeed assume by redutio that
there is some W ∈ WK⊥B such that M ∈ W . Then, according to Definition
3.1, there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = {M}. Therefore, since
B ∩ K = B = {α1, α2, α3} and M 	∈ ‖¬α2‖ ∪ ‖¬α3‖, it must be the case that
W ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = {M}. But, also from Definition 3.1 it follows that there must
be some world N ∈ W ∩ ‖¬α2‖ and then, because ‖¬α2‖ ⊂ ‖¬α1‖, we
conclude that N ∈ W ∩ ‖¬α1‖ which contradicts W ∩ ‖¬α1‖ = {M} (since
from N ∈ ‖¬α2‖ and M 	∈ ‖¬α2‖ it follows immediately that N 	= M).
Hence
⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ B ∩ K} 	⊆ ⋃ WK⊥B.
3. Follows trivially from the counterexample presented above. 
Proof of Observation 3.9 If B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅ or B ∩ K = ∅ then using Obser-
vation 3.2-1. and 2. it can be trivially shown that
⋃
WK⊥B = ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈
BN ∩ K} = ∅. Now we assume that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and B ∩ K 	= ∅, and we
prove the equality by double inclusion:
(⊆) Let M ∈ ⋃ WK⊥B, then there is some W ∈ WK⊥B such that M ∈ W .
Then, according to Definition 3.1 it holds that: (i) W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all
αi ∈ B ∩ K and (ii) there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = {M}.
If α j ∈ BN . Then, α j ∈ BN ∩ K and M ∈ ‖¬α j‖. Therefore we can con-
clude that M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}, and we are done.
If α j 	∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 4.3 that there is some αk ∈
BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬α j‖. So, from (i) and (ii) we can conclude
that M ∈ ‖¬αk‖. Furthermore, from α j ∈ K and ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬α j‖ we can
conclude that αk ∈ K (since from ‖¬α j‖ ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅ and ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬α j‖ it
follows that ‖¬αk‖ ∩ ‖K‖ = ∅). Hence, M ∈ ⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}, as
required.
(⊇) Follows trivially from Lemma 4.5. 
Proof of Observation 3.11 The equality of sets ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ WK⊥B
) = ‖K‖ ∪(⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
follows immediately from Observation 3.9.
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On the other hand, according to Observation 3.10, it holds that K ·∼· B =⋂ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
))
. Therefore it follows that ‖K ·∼· B‖ ⊇
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
.
Now we prove the converse inclusion. If B ∩ K = ∅, then ‖K ·∼· B‖ = ‖K‖ ⊆
‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
and we are done.
So, let B ∩ K 	= ∅. Then, making use of Lemma 4.3, it follows trivially that
BN ∩ K 	= ∅. Now let M ∈ ‖K ·∼· B‖ and assume by redutio that M 	∈ ‖K‖ ∪(⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}). Then there is some δ ∈ K such that ¬δ ∧ &(BN ∩
K) ∈ M and therefore, because M is consistent, δ ∨ ¬&(BN ∩ K) 	∈ M.
On the other hand, since δ ∨ ¬&(BN ∩ K) ∈ ⋂
(‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈
BN ∩ K})) = K ·∼· B, it follows that M 	∈ ‖K ·∼· B‖, which contradicts our hypoth-
esis, and this finishes the proof. 
Proof of Observation 3.12 Let ·∼· the operator of full meet multiple con-
traction on K. Then K ·∼· B ⊆ K÷B. Hence, by Proposition 2.2-(iii),
we can conclude that ‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K ·∼· B‖. Finally, since ‖K ·∼· B‖ = ‖K‖ ∪(⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}
)
(according to Observation 3.11), we can conclude
that ‖K÷B‖ ⊆ ‖K‖ ∪ (⋃{‖¬αi‖ : αi ∈ BN ∩ K}), as we wished to show. 
Proof of Observation 3.13
(1.)
(⊆) Let W ∈ WK⊥B. We must show that W ∈ WK⊥(BN∩K). Hence, ac-
cording to Definition 3.1, we must prove that:
(i) W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ BN ∩ K.
(ii) If M ∈ W then there is some α j ∈ BN ∩ K such that W ∩
‖¬α j‖ = {M}.
Condition (i) follows immediately from W ∈ WK⊥B and Definition
3.1. Now let M be an arbitrary element of W . To show that (ii)
holds it we must prove that there is some α j ∈ BN ∩ K such that
W ∩ ‖¬α j‖ = {M}. Since W ∈ WK⊥B, we have that there is some
αi ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ = {M}. If αi ∈ BN we are done.
Now we assume that αi 	∈ BN . Then, it follows from Lemma 4.3
that there is some αk ∈ BN such that ‖¬αk‖ ⊂ ‖¬αi‖. Hence, since
W ∩ ‖¬αk‖ 	= ∅ (according to Definition 3.1), from W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ =
{M} we can conclude that W ∩ ‖¬αk‖ = {M}.
(⊇) Let W ∈ WK⊥(BN∩K). Then conditions (i) and (ii) above are sat-
isfied. Next, in order to show that W ∈ WK⊥B, we prove that:
a. W ∩ ‖¬αi‖ 	= ∅, for all αi ∈ B ∩ K.
b. If M ∈ W then there is some α j ∈ B ∩ K such that W ∩
‖¬α j‖ = {M}.
Condition a. follows immediately from (i) and Lemma 4.3. On the other
hand condition b . is an obvious consequence of (ii) and the fact that
BN ∩ K ⊆ B ∩ K.
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(2.) Left-to-right: Let K⊥B = K⊥C. We must show that WK⊥B = WK⊥C.
But since, according to part (1), this last equality is equivalent to
WK⊥(BN∩K) = WK⊥(CN∩K), it is enough to show the latter of these
identities.
Since K⊥B = K⊥C, it holds that every subset X of K implies some
element of B if and only if X implies some element of C (according
to [15, Observation 1.39]). Therefore, it follows from Lemma 4.6 and
Definition 3.1 that WK⊥(BN∩K) = WK⊥(CN∩K), and we are done.
Right-to-left: Let WK⊥B = WK⊥C. It follows immediately from Corollary
3.5 that K⊥B = K⊥C. 
Proof of Theorem 3.14
Right-to-left Let K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
, for all sets B. In order to
show that ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction we must show that there is
some package selection function γ for K, such that K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B). Now
let γ be the operator defined by γ (K⊥B) = {K} if K⊥B = ∅, and γ (K⊥B) =
{Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ f (WK⊥B)} if K⊥B 	= ∅. We will show that (a) γ is a
package selection function for K and (b) K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B).
In order to prove (a) we must prove first that γ is a function; i.e., if K⊥C =
K⊥B then γ (K⊥C) = γ (K⊥B) which follows immediately from Observation
3.13-2 and the definition of γ . Now we must prove that γ is a package selection
function for K. If K⊥B = ∅ then by the definition of γ , γ (K⊥B) = {K}. Let
K⊥B 	= ∅. Then B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ and, due to Observation 3.2-1., it follows
that WK⊥B 	= ∅. Then, by Definition 3.3, we have that ∅ 	= f (WK⊥B) ⊆ WK⊥B.
Theorem 3.4-1. yields Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) ∈ K⊥B, for all W ∈ f (WK⊥B). Hence we
can conclude that γ (K⊥B) is a non-empty subset of K⊥B.
To prove (b) we have two cases: Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. Then
WK⊥B = ∅ (by Observation 3.2-1.) and it follows from Definition 3.3
that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
)) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ ∅)) = Th(‖K‖ ∪ ∅) =
K (where this last equality is justified by Proposition 2.2-(i)). On the other
hand, it follows from the definition of γ that
⋂
γ (K⊥B) = ⋂{K} = K. There-
fore K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B).
Case 2, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Then K÷B = ⋂{Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ f (WK⊥B)}
and γ (K⊥B) = {Th(‖K‖ ∪ W) : W ∈ f (WK⊥B)} from which it follows trivially
that K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B). Hence ÷ is a partial meet multiple contraction on K.
Left-to-right Let ÷ be a partial meet multiple contraction on K. Then there
is some package selection function γ for K, such that K÷B = ⋂ γ (K⊥B),
where if B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅ then γ (K⊥B) = {K}, and if B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅ then ∅ 	=
γ (K⊥B) ⊆ K⊥B. We must prove that there exists a propositional package
selection function f for ‖K‖ such that K÷B = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
.
Let f be defined in the following way: f (WK⊥B) = ∅ if B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅ and
f (WK⊥B) = {WX ∈ WK⊥B : X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ WX) ∈ γ (K⊥B)} if B ∩ Cn(∅) =
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∅. We will show that f is a propositional package selection function for
‖K‖. Since when WK⊥B = WK⊥C, it follows from Observation 3.13-2 and the
definition of f that f (WK⊥B) = f (WK⊥C), we can conclude that f is a function.
Now we must prove that f satisfies conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 3.3.
That f (WK⊥B) ⊆ WK⊥B follows immediately from the definition of f . On the
other hand, if WK⊥B 	= ∅ it follows from Observation 3.2-1. that B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅
and, consequently, γ (K⊥B) 	= ∅. Then, by Theorem 3.4-2. we can conclude
that ∅ 	= {WX ∈ WK⊥B : X = Th(‖K‖ ∪ WX) ∈ γ (K⊥B)} = f (WK⊥B). There-
fore f is a propositional package selection function for ‖K‖.
It only remains to show that
⋂
γ (K⊥B) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
.
Case 1, B ∩ Cn(∅) 	= ∅. Then, on the one hand γ (K⊥B) = {K} and, on the
other hand, according to Observation 3.2-1., WK⊥B = ∅. Therefore it follows
trivially that
⋂
γ (K⊥B) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
.
Case 2, B ∩ Cn(∅) = ∅. Then it follows from Theorem 3.4-2. and
from the definition of f that {X : X ∈γ (K⊥B)}={Th(‖K‖∪WX) :WX ∈
f (WK⊥B)}. Therefore, we obtain that ⋂ γ (K⊥B) = ⋂{X : X ∈ γ (K⊥B)} =⋂{Th(‖K‖∪WX) :WX ∈ f (WK⊥B)} = ⋂{⋂(‖K‖ ∪ WX) : WX ∈ f (WK⊥B)} =⋂ (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
)) = Th (‖K‖ ∪ (⋃ f (WK⊥B)
))
, and this finishes the
proof. 
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